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Abstract—Due to the wide adoption of IoT/CPS systems,
embedded devices (IoT frontends) become increasingly connected
and mission-critical, which in turn has attracted advanced attacks
(e.g., control-flow hijacks and data-only attacks). Unfortunately,
IoT backends (e.g., remote controllers or in-cloud services) are
unable to detect if such attacks have happened while receiving
data, service requests, or operation status from IoT devices
(remotely deployed embedded devices). As a result, currently,
IoT backends are forced to blindly trust the IoT devices that
they interact with.
To fill this void, we first formulate a new security property
for embedded devices, called “Operation Execution Integrity” or
OEI. We then design and build a system, OAT, that enables
remote OEI attestation for ARM-based bare-metal embedded
devices. Our formulation of OEI captures the integrity of both
control flow and critical data involved in an operation execution.
Therefore, satisfying OEI entails that an operation execution is
free of unexpected control and data manipulations, which existing
attestation methods cannot check. Our design of OAT strikes a
balance between prover’s constraints (embedded devices’ lim-
ited computing power and storage) and verifier’s requirements
(complete verifiability and forensic assistance). OAT uses a new
control-flow measurement scheme, which enables lightweight and
space-efficient collection of measurements (97% space reduction
from the trace-based approach). OAT performs the remote
control-flow verification through abstract execution, which is
fast and deterministic. OAT also features lightweight integrity
checking for critical data (74% less instrumentation needed
than previous work). Our security analysis shows that OAT
allows remote verifiers or IoT backends to detect both control-
flow hijacks and data-only attacks that affect the execution of
operations on IoT devices. In our evaluation using real embedded
programs, OAT incurs a runtime overhead of 2.7%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet-of-Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS)
are being rapidly deployed in smart homes, automated fac-
tories, intelligent cities, and more. As a result, embedded
devices, playing the central roles as sensors, actuators, or
edge-computing nodes in IoT systems, are becoming attrac-
tive targets for cyber attacks. Unlike computers, attacks on
embedded devices can cause not only software failures or data
breaches but also physical damage. Moreover, a compromised
device can trick or manipulate the IoT backend (e.g., remote
controllers or in-cloud services): hijacking operations and
forging data.
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Unfortunately, today’s IoT backends cannot protect them-
selves from manipulations by compromised IoT devices. This
is due to the lack of a technique for remotely verifying if an
operation performed by an IoT device has been disrupted, or
any critical data has been corrupted while being processed on
the device. As a result, IoT backends are forced to blindly trust
remote devices for faithfully performing assigned operations
and providing genuine data. Our work aims to make this trust
verifiable, and therefore, prevent compromised IoT devices
from deceiving or manipulating the IoT backend.
We take the general approach of remote attestation, which
allows a device to prove its integrity (with regard to certain
security properties) to a remote verifier. Although a large body
of works on remote attestation exists [54], [60], [61], [55],
[12], [36], they have different goals from ours. Moreover, most
of them are focused on verifying basic security properties,
such as static code text integrity, and therefore cannot capture
the advanced attacks that are becoming mainstream recently.
For example, return-oriented programming (ROP) and data-
only attacks are easy to launch on embedded devices, as
demonstrated on vulnerable industrial robot controllers [51].
C-FLAT [2] took the first step towards control-flow integrity
(CFI) attestation. But a major limitation of C-FLAT is the
non-deterministic verifiability of its control-flow hashes (i.e.,
a given hash may not be verifiable due to the program path
explosion issue). Moreover, C-FLAT does not check data
integrity (i.e., data-only attacks are not covered).
In this paper, we introduce the first attestation method that
captures both control-flow and data-only attacks on embedded
devices. Using this method, IoT backends can now verify if a
remote device is trustworthy when it claims it has performed
an operation, sent in a service request, or transported back
data from the field. In addition, unlike traditional attestation
methods, which only output a binary result, our method allows
verifiers to reconstruct attack execution traces for postmortem
analysis.
Our attestation is based on a new security property that
we formulated, called Operation Execution Integrity (OEI),
which combines both the control-flow integrity and critical
data integrity of an “operation” (i.e., a self-contained task or
logic). An operation satisfies OEI if and only if the operation
was performed without its control flow altered or its critical
data corrupted during the execution. For an operation to be
attested, the IoT device (i.e., prover) sends an unforgeable
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OEI measurement to the IoT backend (i.e., verifier), along
with any output from the operation. The backend then checks
the measurement to determine if OEI was satisfied during
the operation. The backend accepts the operation output from
the device only if the check passes (i.e., the received data or
request is trustworthy).
OEI takes advantage of the “operation-oriented” design of
embedded programs: code is typically organized in logically
independent operations, such as moving a robotic arm, inject-
ing a dose of medicine, sensing temperature, etc. Rather than
covering an entire program, OEI is focused on the execution
of individual operations (hence the name). This per-operation
property allows for on-demand and efficient attestation on
embedded devices without sacrificing security (§III-B).
We design and implement OAT (OEI ATtester), a system
that enables OEI attestation on ARM-based embedded devices.
It consists of a customized compiler for building attestation-
enabled binaries, a runtime measurement engine running on
IoT devices, and a verification engine for IoT backends. OAT
addresses two key challenges associated with OEI attestation,
or any remote attestation of control-flow and data integrity:
(1) Incomplete verification of control-flow integrity: Con-
ventional hash-based attestation [2] can only verify a (small)
subset of program executions (i.e., incomplete verification
of control-flow). It is because this approach checks a given
control-flow hash against a limited set of hashes pre-computed
from known-legitimate program runs. This static hash pre-
computation can never cover all possibilities due to program
path explosions, even for small programs. As a result, this
attestation cannot verify control-flow hashes, legitimate or not,
outside of the pre-computed set.
We design a hybrid control-flow attestation scheme for
OAT, which combines hashes and compact execution traces.
This scheme enables complete control-flow verification as
well as attack flow reconstruction, at the cost of a mildly
increased measurement size. Our attestation scheme is partly
inspired by the tracing-based CFI enforcement [24], [59]. But
unlike previous work, which requires hardware tracing mod-
ules unavailable on deployed or debugging-disabled embedded
devices,
our scheme uses its own software-based tracing technique.
Moreover, thanks to the combined use of hash and traces,
OAT’s space overhead is only a tiny fraction (2.24%) of
tracing-based CFI’s overhead. In addition, OAT checks both
forward- and backward-edges. We discuss the details in §IV.
(2) Heavy data integrity checking: The existing data integrity
checkers [13], [3], [11] have to instrument every memory-
write instruction and sometimes memory-read instructions
in a program. The heavy and extensive instrumentation is
needed because these checkers have to decide during runtime,
for every instrumented instruction, whether the instruction
is allowed to store/load data to/from the referenced address.
We call this address-based checking, which is too heavy for
embedded devices.
OAT uses a novel data integrity checking technique. First,
it only covers critical variables because not all program data
is relevant to an operation to be attested. Critical variables are
those that may affect the outcome of an operation. They are
automatically detected by OAT or annotated by developers.
Second, instead of address-based checking, our technique
performs value-based checking. It checks if the value of a
critical variable at an instrumented load instruction (i.e., use)
remains the same as the value recorded at the previous instru-
mented store instruction (i.e., define). It only instruments the
instructions that are supposed to access the critical variables,
rather than instrumenting all memory-accessing instructions as
address-based checkers would, even when only selected vari-
ables need checking. Our technique on average requires 74%
fewer instrumentation than address-based checking does. We
call this “Value-based Define-Use Check”, which is discussed
in §V.
Using OAT, IoT backends can now for the first time remotely
verify operations performed by IoT devices. Our security
analysis (§VIII-C) shows that OAT detects both control and
data manipulations that are undetectable by existing attestation
methods for embedded devices. Our performance evaluation
(§VIII), based on real embedded programs, shows that OAT,
on average, slows down program execution by 2.73% and
increases the binary size by 13%.
In summary, our work makes the following contributions:
• We formulate a new security property, OEI, for IoT
backends to attest the integrity of operations executed on
remote IoT/embedded devices. It covers both control-flow
and critical data integrity.
• We design a hybrid attestation scheme, which uses both
hashes and execution traces to achieve complete control-
flow verification while keeping the size of control-flow
measurements acceptable for embedded devices.
• We present a light-weight variable integrity checking
mechanism, which uses selective and value-based check-
ing to keep the overhead low without sacrificing security.
• We design and build OAT to realize OEI attestation
on both the prover- and verifier-side. OAT contains
the compile-time, run-time, and verification-time compo-
nents.
• We evaluate OAT on five real-world embedded programs
that cover broad use scenarios of IoT devices, demon-
strating the practicality of OAT in real-world cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Attacks on IoT Devices and Backends
Embedded devices, essential for IoT, have been increas-
ingly targeted by powerful attacks. For instance, hackers have
managed to subvert different kinds of smart home gadgets,
including connected lights [53], locks [31], etc. In industrial
systems, robot controllers [51] and PLCs (Programmable
Logic Controller) [22] were exploited to perform unintended
or harmful operations. The same goes for connected cars [42],
[34], drones [30], and medical devices [23], [52]. In addition,
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large-scale IoT deployments were compromised to form bot-
nets via password cracking [56], and recently, vulnerability
exploits [40].
Meanwhile, advanced attacks quickly emerged. Return-
oriented Programming (ROP) was demonstrated to be real-
istic on RISC [8], and particularly ARM [39], which is the
common architecture for today’s embedded devices. Data-only
attacks [15], [33] are not just applicable but well-suited for
embedded devices [62], due to the data-intensive or data-
driven nature of IoT.
Due to the poor security of today’s embedded devices, IoT
backends (e.g., remote IoT controllers and in-cloud services)
are recommended to operate under the assumption that IoT
devices in the field can be compromised and should not be
fully trusted [57]. However, in reality, IoT backends are
often helpless when deciding whether or to what extent it
should trust an IoT device. They may resort to the existing
remote attestation techniques, but these techniques are only
effective at detecting the basic attacks (e.g., device or code
modification) while leaving advanced attacks undetected (e.g.,
ROP, data-only attacks, etc.). As a result, IoT backends have
no choice but to trust IoT devices and assume they would
faithfully execute commands and generate genuine data or
requests. This blind and unwarranted trust can subject IoT
backends to deceptions and manipulations. For example, a
compromised robotic arm can drop a command yet still report
a success back to its controller; a compromised industrial
syringe can perform an unauthorized chemical injection, or
change an authorized injection volume, without the controller’s
knowledge.
Our work enables IoT backends to reliably verify if an
operation performed by a device has suffered from control
or data attacks. It solves an important open problem that IoT
backends currently have no means to determine if data, results,
or requests sent from (insecure) IoT devices are trustworthy.
Moreover, it allows backends to reconstruct attack control
flows, which are valuable for forensic analysis.
B. ARM TrustZone
Our system relies on ARM TrustZone to establish the
TCB (Trusted Computing Base). TrustZone is a hardware
feature available on both Cortex-A processors (for mobile and
high-end IoT devices) and Cortex-M processors (for low-cost
embedded systems). TrustZone renders a so-called “Secure
World”, an isolated environment with tagged caches, banked
registers, and private memory for securely executing a stack of
trusted software, including a tiny OS and trusted applications
(TA). In parallel runs the so-called “Normal World”, which
contains the regular/untrusted software stack. Code in the
Normal World, called client applications (CA), can invoke TAs
in the Secure World. A typical use of TrustZone involves a
CA requesting a sensitive service from a corresponding TA,
such as signing or securely storing a piece of data. In addition
to executing critical code, TrustZone can also be used for
mediating peripheral access from the Normal World.
OAT measurement engine runs as a TA in the Secure World.
Its code and data, including collected measurements, are
naturally protected. TrustZone allows provisions of per-device
private keys and certificates, which enable straightforward
authentication and signed/encrypted communication between
a measurement engine (i.e., prover) and a remote verifier.
During an active attestation phase, the instrumented code in the
Normal World reports raw measurements to the Secure World,
where the raw measurements are processed and signed. The
final report (aka. measurement blob) along with the signature
is handed back to the Normal World agent, which sends
the report to the remote verifier. On our target platforms
(i.e., ARM-based bare-metal embedded devices), TrustZone
is the only feasible TCB option that can support basic remote
attestation operations. Our evaluation (§VIII) shows that the
end-to-end overhead of our system is acceptable, thanks to our
efficient attestation scheme.
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
A. Example: A Vulnerable Robotic Arm
Before we discuss OEI and the attestation, we first present
a simple example to demonstrate the problem. The vulnerabil-
ities shown in this example were drawn from real embedded
programs. This example is also referenced in a later discussion
on how OEI attestation can be easily applied to existing code.
In this example of a vulnerable robotic arm (Listing 1), the
function main_looper first retrieves an operation command
from a remote controller and stores it in cmd (Line 11).
The looper then reads a peripheral sensor (Line 12), which
indicates if the arm is ready to perform a new operation.
If ready, the looper finds the operation function specified by
cmd->op (Line 15) and calls the function with the parameters
supplied in cmd->param (Line 16). One such function (Line
25) moves the arm to a given position.
We introduce an attacker whose goal is to manipulate the
operation of the robotic arm without being detected by the
remote controller who uses the existing attestation methods.
For simplicity, we assume the attacker has tampered with
the sensor and uses it to feed exploit input to the robotic
arm. This is realistic given that such external peripherals are
difficult to authenticate and protect. The target of the attacker
is Function get_input (Line 12), which contains a buffer
overrun. The vulnerability allows malformatted input to be
copied beyond the destination buffer (peripheral_input)
into the subsequent stack variables (e.g., cmd).
By crafting input via the compromised sensor, the attacker
can launch either control hijacking or data-only attacks on the
robotic arm. To hijack the control, the attacker overwrites both
cmd->param and cmd->op as a result of the buffer overrun
exploit, which leads to the execution of an arbitrary operation.
To mount a data-only attack, the attacker only needs to change
cmd->param while leaving cmd->op intact, which turns the
authorized operation harmful.
Though seemingly simple, such control and data manip-
ulations on embedded devices are realistic and can cause
severe consequences in the physical world. More importantly,
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1 // Simplified control loop for robotic arms
2 void main_looper() {
3 // Command from remote controller
4 cmd_t cmd;
5 // Pointer to operation function
6 int (*op_func)(int, char*);
7 // Input from peripheral sensor
8 char peripheral_input[128];
9 int st = 0;
10 while(1) {
11 if (read_command(&cmd)) {
12 st = get_input(peripheral_input); //BUGGY!
13 if (status_OK(st)) {
14 // perform the operation
15 op_func = get_op_func(cmd->op);
16 (*op_func)(cmd->p_size, cmd->param);
17 }
18 }
19 usleep(LOOPER_SLEEP_TIMER);
20 }
21 return;
22 }
23 ...
24 // The operation that moves the robotic arm
25 int op_move_arm (int, char*) {...}
26 ...
Listing 1: An example of a control loop in a robotic arm
existing remote attestation methods cannot detect such attacks
because most of them are focused on static code integrity and
none addresses dynamic data integrity. Therefore, the remote
controller is unable to find that the robotic arm is compromised
and did not perform the operation as commanded. Moreover,
after receiving an (unverifiable) operation-success message
from the compromised robotic arm, the controller may com-
mand other robotic arms to perform follow-up operations,
which can cause further damage. This example illustrates the
need for a new form of attestation that allows IoT backends to
remotely check the integrity of operations performed by IoT
devices.
B. Operation Execution Integrity (OEI)
We propose “Operation Execution Integrity” (or OEI) as a
security property for embedded devices. By verifying OEI,
a remote verifier can quickly check if an execution of an
operation suffered from control-flow hijack or experienced
critical data corruption. We formulate OEI with two goals
in mind: (i) enabling remote detection of aforementioned
attacks; (ii) demonstrating the feasibility of an operation-
oriented attestation that can detect to both control and critical
data manipulations on embedded devices. Next, we formally
define OEI and provide its rationale.
To avoid ambiguity, we informally define an operation to
be a logically independent task performed by an embedded
device. To declare an operation for attestation, programmers
need to identify the entry and exit points of the operation in
their code. For simplicity of discussion, we assume that every
operation is implemented in a way that it has a single pair of
entry and exit, 〈Opentry, Opexit〉 where Opentry dominates
Opexit and Opexit post-dominates Opentry in the control flow
graph. We do not pose any restriction on what code can an
operation include or invoke, except that an operation cannot
contain another operation.
Let P = {Op1, Op2, ...Opn} be an embedded program,
composed of n operations, denoted as Opi. CFG(Opi) is the
statically constructed CFG (control flow graph) for Opi (i.e.,
the CFG’s root is Opi’s entry point). Let CV be the set of
critical variables in P (i.e., variables affecting the execution
of the operations). D(v) and U(v) are the def- and use-sites
of a critical variable v: a set of statements where v is defined
or used. Vb(v, s) and Va(v, s) are the values of variable v
immediately before and after statement s executes.
Definition 1. OEI: for an operation Opi, its execution satisfies
OEI ⇐⇒ 1© the control flow complies with CFG(Opi)
and maintains backward-edge integrity, and 2© during the
execution, ∀cv ∈ CV , the value of cv reaching each use-site
is the same as the value of cv leaving the previous def-site,
written as Vb(cv, u) = Va(cv, d), where d ∈ D(cv) is the last
define of cv prior to the use of cv at u ∈ U(cv). 4
OEI entails that the control-flows and critical data involved
in an operation must not be tampered with.
Operation-scoped CFI (§IV): OEI’s control-flow requirement
( 1© in Def. 1) is not a simple adoption of CFI to embedded
devices, which would incur impractical time and space over-
head on those constrained devices. Our operation-scoped CFI
takes advantage of the operation-oriented design of embedded
programs. It applies to executions of individual operations,
which represent a much smaller attestation scope than a whole
program and allow for on-demand attestation. It also implies
backward-edge integrity (i.e., returns not hijacked).
Critical Variable Integrity (§V): We call the second require-
ment of OEI ( 2© in Def. 1) Critical Variable Integrity, or
CVI. It dictates that the values of critical variables must obey
define-use consistency. Compared with other data integrity
checkers [13], [3], [11] CVI is different in two ways. First, CVI
only concerns critical variables, rather than all program data.
Second, CVI uses value-based checking, instead of address-
based checking, to significantly reduce code instrumentation
and runtime overhead. CVI applies to the entire program
execution and is not scoped by attested operations. We provide
a method to assist developers to automatically identify critical
variables. We define critical variables and explain our value-
based check in §V.
Secure & Optimized Combination: OEI combines CVI
and operation-scoped CFI. These two sub-properties mutually
complementary. Without CVI, CFI alone cannot detect data-
only attacks or control-flow hijacks that do not violate CFG
(e.g., [10]). Without CFI, CVI can be bypassed (e.g., by
ROP). On the other hand, this combination yields better
performance than independently performing control-flow and
data-flow checks. This optimized combination allows for the
detection of both control-flow and data-only attacks without
enforcing full CFI and DFI. It is suited for embedded devices.
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Fig. 1: The Workflow of OAT, whose components (colored in yellow)
include the compiler, the trampoline library, the measurement engine
in the Secure World (shown in green), and the remote verification
engine.
Operation Verifiability: OEI caters to IoT’s unique security
needs. One defining characteristic of IoT devices is their
frequent inter-operations with peers or cloud services. When a
device finishes an operation, the operation initiator may wish
to verify if the operation was executed as expected without
interference. For example, a remote controller needs to verify
if a robotic arm has performed a movement as instructed
without experiencing any control or data manipulations. OEI
attestation answers to such security needs of IoT, which are
currently not addressed.
C. OAT Overview
We build OAT, a system to realize OEI ATtestation on
ARM-based bare-metal embedded devices (i.e., no standalone
OS in the Normal World). OAT consists of: (i) a customized
compiler built on LLVM; (ii) a trampoline library linked
to attestation-enabled programs; (iii) a runtime measurement
engine; (iv) a remote/offline verification engine (Figure 1).
For a given embedded program, the compiler identifies the
critical variables and instruments the code for measurement
collection. At runtime, the measurement engine processes
the instrumented control-flow and data events and produces
a proof or measurement, which the remote verifier checks
and determines if the operation execution meets OEI. OAT
relies on ARM TrustZone to provide the trusted execution
environment for the measurement engine.
We design a hybrid attestation scheme that overcomes two
challenges associated with CFI and data integrity verifica-
tions. First, remotely attesting CFI is more challenging than
performing local CFI enforcement because remote verifiers
can only rely on limited after-fact measurements to make
the determination whereas local enforcers simply use the
readily available unlimited runtime information. Furthermore,
remote verifiers cannot always determine whether a hash-
based control-flow measurement is legitimate or not because
the verifiability is limited to those hashes pre-computed from
known/traversed code paths.
Second, checking the integrity of dynamic data is known
for its high overhead. Existing checkers [13], [3], [11], mostly
address-based, instrument every memory-accessing instruction
in a program, and during runtime, check if an instrumented
instruction should be allowed to access the referenced address,
based on a statically constructed access table. Even when
the integrity checking is only applied to selected variables,
address-based checkers would still need to instrument and
check all memory-accessing instructions to ensure no unin-
tended instructions can write to the addresses of the critical
variables.
Our hybrid attestation scheme achieves complete verifiabil-
ity while maintaining acceptable performance on embedded
devices. For CFI attestation, OAT’s measurements contain
compact control-flow transfer traces for forward-edges and
fixed-length hashes for backward-edges. This combination
allows remote verifiers to quickly and deterministically re-
construct control flows. It also yields size-optimized measure-
ments. For CVI, OAT performs local verification rather than
remote attestation. By doing so, OAT avoids sending a large
amount of data (e.g., critical values at def- and use-sites) to
remote verifiers. Sending such data would be costly for IoT
devices and undesirable when privacy is concerned.
To use OEI attestation, programmers declare the to-
be-attested operations in their code by using two in-
tuitive compiler directives: #oei_attest_begin and
#oei_attest_end. They may also annotate critical vari-
ables of their choice via a GCC-style attribute. For example, to
enable OEI attestation in Listing 1, a programmer only needs
to change Line 4, 8, and 25:
4 cmd_t __attribute__((annotate("critical"))) cmd;
8 int __attribute__((annotate("critical")))
peripheral_input = 0;
25 int op_move_arm (int, char*) {#oei_attest_begin
... #oei_attest_end}
For simplicity, our current design requires that a pair of
#oei_attest_begin and #oei_attest_end is used in
the same function (i.e., an operation enters and exits in the
same call stack frame) and the #oei_attest_end always
dominates the #oei_attest_begin (i.e., an operation al-
ways exits). Operations cannot be nested. These requirements
are checked by our compiler. Developers are advised to keep
the scope of an operation minimal and the logic self-contained,
which is not difficult because most embedded programs are
already written in an operation-oriented fashion.
As shown in Figure 1, during compilation, the customized
compiler instruments a set of control flow transfers inside each
to-be-attested operation. The compiler automatically annotates
control-dependent variables as critical (e.g., condition vari-
ables). It also performs a global data dependency analysis on
both automatically and manually annotated critical variables
so that their dependencies are also treated as critical and
subject to CVI checks. At runtime, the instrumented control
flow transfers and critical variable define/use events trigger the
corresponding trampolines, which pass the information needed
for CFI or CVI verification to the measurement engine in
the Secure World protected by TrustZone. Finally, the signed
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attestation blob (i.e., measurements) is sent to the remote
verification engine (e.g., IoT backend) along with the output
from the attested operation. We discuss OAT design details in
§IV and §V.
D. Threat Model
We trust code running inside the Secure World (e.g., the
measurement engine) and assume that attackers cannot break
the TrustZone protection. We also trust our compiler and the
trampoline code. We assume that attackers cannot inject code
in the Normal World or tamper with the instrumented code
or the trampoline library. This can be enforced using code
integrity protection methods for embedded devices [16], [37],
which are orthogonal to the focus of this paper, namely OEI
attestation. Due to the absence of a standalone OS on bare-
metal embedded devices, all code in the Normal World runs at
the same privilege level (i.e., no higher privileged code exists
or needs to be trusted).
On the other hand, we anticipate the following attacks in
the Normal World, which previous attestation methods cannot
detect. First, attackers may exploit vulnerabilities to launch
ROP (return-oriented programming) and DOP (data-oriented
programming) attacks. As a result, the control flow and the
critical data of an embedded program can be compromised.
Second, attackers may abuse unprotected interfaces of an
embedded program and force the device to perform unintended
or unauthorized operations. Our system is designed to detect
these attacks by means of attestation. We present a security
analysis on our system in §VIII-D.
IV. OPERATION-SCOPED CONTROL-FLOW ATTESTATION
Inspired by the operation-oriented nature of embedded
programs, we attest CFI at the operation level, which avoids
always-on measurement collection and whole-program instru-
mentation. It is lightweight and suitable for embedded devices.
Moreover, our attestation provides deterministic verifiabil-
ity. It avoids the problem of unverifiable control-flow hashes,
caused by code path explosions, as purely hash-based attesta-
tion faces [2]. The deterministic verifiability is achieved via a
new hybrid measurement scheme, which uses a compact trace
for recording forward edges and a hash for backward edges.
This scheme resembles the hardware tracing-based CFI [24],
[59]. But it has two major distinctions.
First, previous tracing-based CFI requires hardware com-
ponents that are not available on deployed IoT or embedded
devices1. Our control flow traces are generated purely using
the software. Second, our trace is much shorter and more
compact partly because it only records forward edges (i.e.,
backward edges or returns happen very frequently and thus
would lead to overly long traces that embedded devices cannot
store). By hashing the backward edges, rather than recording
them in the trace, our scheme reduces the trace size by
97% (§VIII-B). Furthermore, combining trace and hash makes
1Although recent MCUs support tracing, this optional feature is meant for
debugging and usually unavailable on for-release devices due to additional
hardware cost.
verification deterministic and free of path explosions. Verifiers
no longer need to pre-compute or search for all possible code
paths; they simply follow the forward-edge trace to reconstruct
the actual execution path, and in the end, check the resulting
backward-edge hash (more details later).
Instrumented Control Flow Events: OAT compiler instru-
ments the code in each attestation-enabled operation to collect
runtime measurements. We limit this instrumentation to a
minimum set of the control flow transfers that need to be
recorded/encoded in the measurement for deterministic ver-
ification. This minimum set, Smin, is constructed as follows.
Consider all three types of transfers possible on a CFG:
direct call/jump, conditional branch, and indirect transfers
(indirect call/jump and return). Only the last two types need
to be measured and are included in Smin. This is because
knowing where each branch and indirect transfer went during
a code execution is both sufficient and necessary for statically
finding the exact operation execution path on the CFG. Direct
calls and jumps are not included in Smin (i.e., no need for
instrumentation) because their destinations are unique and
statically determinate.
The instrumentation code simply calls the trampoline func-
tion corresponding to the type of the instrumented control-flow
transfer, reporting the destination of the transfer. For a branch,
its destination is one bit: taken (1) or non-taken (0). For an
indirect transfer, its destination is the memory address. The
trampoline functions are thin wrappers of the world-switching
routine. When called, they initiate the switch to the Secure
World and pass the destination information to the measurement
engine.
Measurement Scheme: The measurement engine maintains
two types of measurements for control-flow attestation: a
trace and a hash. The trace is used for recording forward-
edge control flow transfers (branches and indirect calls/jumps).
The hash is for encoding backward-edge transfers (returns).
The measurement engine updates the measurement trace or
hash respectively, as shown in the upper half of Fig. 2. For
each branch, it adds the taken/non-taken bit to the trace.
For each indirect call/jump, it adds the destination address
to the trace. Note that code addresses do not change across
different firmware runs (including verification runs) because
embedded firmware is always loaded at the pre-specified base
address in memory. When dynamic loading or ASLR becomes
available in embedded firmware, the measurement engine will
need to record the firmware base address in the attestation
blob, in order for the verifier to construct the same code
layout in memory and check the trace. For each return, the
measurement engine encodes the return address to the hash:
H = Hash(H ⊕ RetAddr). Here we use the symbol ⊕
to represent a binary operation. In our implementation, we
use concatenation2. The trace and the hash together form the
2See our formal definition and proof of the verification scheme in Appendix
§B
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Fig. 2: Operation-scoped control-flow attestation. By measuring the control-flow of an executing operation, the measurement engine produces
a control-flow proof that consists of a trace (proving forward edges including branches and indirect transfers) and a hash (proving backward
edges or returns). This measurement scheme allows a remote verifier to statically and deterministically reconstruct the code path of the
operation execution and perform full CFI verification.
attestation blob, which serves as the proof of the control flow
of an executed operation.
In our design, we chose the cryptographic hash function
BLAKE-2s3 as the Hash function for its high speed, security,
and simplicity. BLAKE-2s has a block size of 64 Bytes and
an output size of 32 Bytes. We present the collision analysis
as part of the security analysis in § VIII-D.
The reason why we use two forms of measurements, namely
trace and hash, is two-fold. First, a forward-edge trace allows
for reconstruction and easy verification of recorded control-
flow transfers. Second, a hash has fixed length and does not
grow whereas a trace grows as the execution proceeds. How-
ever, control-flow hashes by themselves are not always veri-
fiable due to the impossibility of pre-computing all possible
code paths for a program and their hashes. Our measurement
scheme uses the trace and hash in tandem to combine their
strengths while avoiding their individual weaknesses, in terms
of the ease of verification and space efficiency.
Recording the forward-edge trace is necessary for code path
reconstruction. These events are either very compact (1 bit
for each branch) or infrequent (indirect calls/jumps are less
common than direct calls/jumps). Therefore, they do not bloat
the trace. On the other hand, we encode return addresses
in the hash because they are not needed during the path
reconstruction phase (i.e., only needed for checking backward-
edge CFI after a path has been constructed). Plus, returns
happen fairly frequently and, if recorded in the trace, would
consume too much space.
A possible (yet to implement) optimization would be to
record the event type information in a separate sequence
and then use this information to enable early detection of
control flow divergences during verification (i.e., when a type
mismatch is detected, the verifier can conclude that the current
stream is invalid and terminate the verification early). For three
types of events (i.e., conditional branch, indirect branch and
return), two bits would be enough for identifying and recording
3https://blake2.net/
each type. This optimization can speed up the verification
process at the cost of using extra storage. However, given the
fact that RAM and flash storage on embedded devices are
fairly limited and the verification process does not affect the
runtime performance, we decided not to implement the early
termination optimization for the current prototype.
The measurements are stored in a buffer allocated in the
Secure World. Although rare, this buffer can run out if an op-
eration execution is very long and yields a measurement trace
longer than the buffer. When this happens, the measurement
engine signs the current measurements, temporarily stores it
in the flash storage, and frees up the buffer for subsequent
measurements. At the end of the operation, the measurement
engine sends all measurements to the remote verifier.
Measurement Verification: Given a control-flow proof for
an operation execution (i.e., a trace and a hash), generated
and signed by the measurement engine, the verification engine
statically reconstructs the code path on the CFG of the
operation, as shown in the lower half of Fig. 2. Starting
from the root basic block, or the entry point, the verifier
abstractly executes the operation on the CFG by following the
forward-edge trace. During the abstract execution, the verifier
maintains a simulated call stack to keep track of the return
addresses and computes/updates the hash in the same way as
the measurement engine does during runtime.
Specifically, when the abstract execution encounters a
control-flow diverging point (i.e., more than one edge on the
CFG can be followed) the verifier takes the next available
element out of the trace and consults it for direction: either a
taken/non-taken bit for a branch or an address for an indirect
call/jump. The verifier also performs a CFI check in case of
an address. A control flow violation is found when: 1© the
CFI check fails; 2© a mismatch is observed between a basic
block and the corresponding trace element (e.g., the current
basic block ends with an indirect call but the next available
element indicates a branch); or 3© after the abstract execution,
the verifier-computed hash does not match the reported hash.
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All indirect call/jump violating CFI trigger 1©. 2© can hap-
pen because when ROP happened during the actual execution,
the trace did not return to the call site whereas the abstract
execution always returns correctly (cued by the simulated call
stack). This mismatch leads to early detection of ROP (i.e.,
no need to wait till 3©). 3© signals that one or more return
addresses (or backward control flow transfers) were corrupted
during runtime. Note that not all ROP trigger 2© but all ROP
trigger 3©.
V. CRITICAL VARIABLE INTEGRITY
Data-only attacks, including data-oriented programming,
are capable of manipulating program behavior and internal
logic without injecting code or violating CFI [15], [33]. For
example, as shown in Listing 1, a simple buffer overflow can
make the robotic arm perform attacker-specified operations
without breaking CFI. Unfortunately, existing attestation meth-
ods cannot detect data-only attacks.
We formulate Critical Variable Integrity (CVI) as a sub-
property of OEI to detect data-only attacks on embedded
devices. CVI is selective and concerns only data that attacks
target: (i) control-dependent data, such as conditional vari-
ables, whose value directly determines the code path of a
particular program execution; (ii) semantically critical data,
whose value, though not directly affecting code execution
paths, influences the outcome of an operation, such as cmd
in Listing 1. CVI is not scoped by attested operations due to
external data dependencies.
CVI is different from previous works on data integrity
check [13], [3], [11], which require heavy instrumentation and
is unsuitable for embedded devices. For example, DFI [13]
uses a whitelist to record which instruction is allowed to
access which memory address. It instruments all memory-
accessing instructions to perform the check during runtime.
DataShield [11] reserves a special memory region for critical
variables to facilitate checks. Even though it concerns only
selected data, DataShield still needs to instrument all memory-
write instructions to prevent illegal access to the reserved
memory region. In general, previous works on program data
integrity share the same fundamental approach, which we call
address-based checking. They need to check every memory-
write instruction and determines if it should be allowed to
write to the referenced address.
In contrast, CVI takes a new approach to data integrity
checking, called Value-based Define-Use Check. It checks
if the value of a critical variable at an instrumented load
instruction (i.e., use) remains the same as the value recorded
at the previous instrumented store instruction (i.e., define).
At an instrumented store instruction, CVI makes a copy of
the value in a secure region guarded by TrustZone. At an
instrumented load instruction, CVI compares the value read
from memory with the copy recorded in TrustZone. Any
data corruption causes a value mismatch and therefore a
CVI breach. CVI only needs to instrument the instructions
that are supposed to read/write the critical variables whereas
address-based checkers have to instrument all memory-write
TABLE I: Comparison between Different Data Integrity Mechanisms
(R:Read, W:Write)
Name Instrumentation Whitelist Check
DFI [13] All memory R&W Yes Addr.
WIT [3] All memory W Yes Addr.
DataShield [11] All memory W No Addr.
CVI Critical variable R&W No Value
instructions even if only selected data needs checking. Table I
shows the comparison between CVI and the previous data
integrity checking techniques.
Critical Variable Identification & Expansion: OAT compiler
automatically identifies control-dependent variables, including
branch/loop condition variables. Note that we do not include
code pointers as critical variables. This is because all control-
flow violations, including those resulted from corrupted code
pointers, are captured by the control-flow part of OEI attes-
tation. OAT relies on programmers to annotate semantically
critical variables because labeling such variables is subjective
and specific to program semantics.
The control-dependent variables (automatically detected)
and the semantically critical variables (annotated by program-
mers) form the initial set of critical variables. Our compiler
then automatically expands this set to include the direct and
indirect pointers to these variables and their dependencies.
Pointers to a critical variable allow indirect define or use
of the variable. Therefore, we treat such data pointers as
special critical variables, referred to as critical pointers. Our
compiler iteratively identifies them from a global points-to
map produced by the standard Anderson pointer analysis.
Dependencies of a critical variable V are the variables that
may influence the value of V. Verifying the integrity of V
implies verifying the integrity of both V and its dependencies.
Given a set of critical variables, our compiler finds all their
dependencies by first constructing the program dependence
graph and then performing a backward traversal for each
variable along the data dependence edges. Newly discovered
variables during the traversal are added to the critical variable
set. The iterative search for dependencies stops when the set
reaches a fixpoint. This automatic dependency discovery also
simplifies critical variable annotation: programmers only need
to annotate one, not all, variable for each piece of critical data.
Value-based Define-Use Check: OAT compiler instruments
all define- and use-sites for each variable in the expanded
critical variable set. During runtime, the instrumentation at
each define-site captures the identity of the critical variable
(i.e., a compiler-generated label) and the value to be assigned
to the variable. It sends the information to the measurement
engine in the Secure World via the trampolines. Similarly,
the use-site instrumentation captures the variable identity and
the current value of the variable and sends them to the
measurement engine.
For an array-typed critical variable, each array element ac-
cess is instrumented by OAT compiler. OAT compiler identifies
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and instruments every memory access whose target address
is calculated as an offset relative to a critical variable. This
critical variable can be an array name or a pointer that points to
a buffer. This design also uniformly covers multi-dimensional
arrays and nested arrays because in both cases an array element
access is based on a memory address that is calculated from the
array’s name or base address. From the measurement engine’s
perspective, it only sees critical variables or critical array
elements identified by their addresses, rather than entire array
objects. The integrity of each element is checked indepen-
dently during runtime.
The measurement engine maintains a hashmap which stores
pairs of <VariableID, Value>. V ariableID is the ad-
dress of a variable or an array element. The measurement
engine updates the hashmap at each instrumented define-site
and checks the value at each instrumented use-site. Regardless
whether a variable is on the stack (local) or the heap (global),
its def-use sites should always have matching values. A
value mismatch indicates a corrupted critical variable. The
measurement engine finally sends the CVI checking result
along with the control-flow measurements in a signed blob
to the remote verifier.
Pointer-based Access to Critical Variables: Consider an
example: *(P+n) = x, where P is the base address of a
critical array A; n is the dynamic index. This is a legitimate
critical variable define-site. Assuming that, due to a program
bug, the dereference *(P+n) could go out of the bounds
of A and reach another critical variable B, the measurement
engine would then mistakenly update the value of B to x in
its hashmap when this out-of-bounds write happens.
We solve this issue by enforcing dynamic bounds checking
on critical pointers. When a critical pointer is dereferenced, the
measurement engine checks if the pointer dereference breaches
the bounds of the current pointee. This check relies on
the dynamic bounds information (similar to SoftBound [46])
collected by the measurement engine for each critical pointer.
If a bounds breach is found, the measurement engine performs
CVI check only on the overlapping bytes between the accessed
memory region and the initially pointed variable (i.e., it only
updates or checks the value of the expected pointee). This de-
sign ensures CVI check correctness while allowing intentional
out-of-bounds pointer dereferences in normal programs.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION
Our OAT prototype implementation includes 6,017 lines of
C++ code for the compiler (an LLVM module), 440 lines of
C and assembly code for the trampoline library, 476 lines of
C code for the measurement engine, and 782 lines of Python
code for the verification engine.
Hardware & Software Choices: We selected a widely used
IoT development board, the HiKey board (ARM Cortex-
A53), as our reference device for prototyping. We made this
choice due to the board’s unlocked/programmable TrustZone,
its full compatibility with open-source TEE OS, and its reliable
debugging tools. We do realize that the board has a relatively
powerful processor compared to some low-end embedded
devices. However, no development board currently available
comes with a low-end ARM processor and an unlocked
TrustZone at the same time. Nevertheless, OAT’s design and
implementation are neither specific to this board nor dependent
on powerful processors. The only hardware requirement OAT
has is the TrustZone extension, which is available on many
commercial embedded ARM SoCs.
We used OP-TEE [45] as our TEE OS (the OS for the
Secure World). Although OAT is designed for bare-metal em-
bedded devices (i.e., no stand-alone OS in the Normal World),
we used the vendor-customized Linux as the Normal World
OS solely for the purpose of easily booting and debugging the
board. OAT itself does not assume the presence of a Normal
World OS. Even though OAT’s performance can be negatively
affected by the unnecessary OS, our evaluation (§VIII) shows
the overhead under this disadvantaged configuration is still
acceptable.
The implementation details of the OAT system is attached
in Appendix §A.
VII. DISCUSSION
Multithreading: Our current prototype only supports single-
thread programs, which constitute the majority of today’s
embedded programs. To attest multi-thread programs, we need
to augment the OAT compiler to instrument threading-related
events and have the measurement engine collect measurements
and perform checks on a per-thread basis. We consider multi-
threading support out-of-scope for this paper because it does
not need any change to the design of OEI attestation but
requires significant engineering efforts to implement.
Interrupt Handling: Interrupt handling poses a challenge to
the control flow verification due to its asynchronous nature.
When an interrupt happens in the middle of an attested
operation, we do not know in advance where the interrupted
location is. If the measurement engine cannot recognize and
process interrupts, they may introduce out-of-context control
flow events that can fail or confuse the verification.
OAT overcomes this challenge by treating each interrupt
handler invoked during an operation as an execution of a
sub-program. It instruments the handler both at the entry and
the exit points. The instrumentation notifies the measurement
engine of the beginning and the end of such a sub-program.
Thus the control flow events of the handler are recorded in a
separate trace and hash and verified independently. OAT also
checks if an invoked interrupt handler matches the interrupt
that triggered the handler.
Annotation: OAT allows programmers to optionally annotate
semantically critical variables for CVI attestation. However,
this annotation is not required for detecting data-oriented pro-
gramming [33], control-flow bending [10], or similar data-only
attacks, whose target data (i.e., control-dependent variables)
are automatically detected by OAT compiler and included in
CVI verification. On the other hand, the annotation process
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TABLE II: Runtime Overhead Breakdown
Overhead Sources Time(CPU Cycles) Time(ms)
Attestation Init (Oat init) 5.1*107 42.879
Trampoline Func(Otramp) 5.5*104 0.045
Attestation Exit (Oat exit) 2.6*107 21.351
for semantically critical variables is simple and facilitated by
the compiler’s automatic dependency analysis.
VIII. EVALUATION AND ANALYSIS
We conducted: (i) micro performance tests to measure the
overhead of each step in OEI attestation; (ii) macro perfor-
mance tests on 5 real embedded programs of different kinds
to examine OAT’s overall overhead; (iii) tests against possible
attacks; (iv) analysis on how OAT defends against evasions.
A. Micro Performance Tests
The runtime overhead of OEI attestation can be broken
down into three parts, as shown in the first column in Table II:
(i) attestation initialization (Oat init), taking place at the entry
of an attestation scope (i.e., an operation); (ii) trampoline
invocation (Otramp), including a direct smc call to initiate
the world switch and a return from the Secure World (i.e.,
the roundtrip world-switch overhead); (iii) attestation exit
(Oat exit), happening at the end of an attestation scope.
We created a test program that incurs each type of overhead
exactly once. We ran this program for 1,024 times and obtained
the average overhead in terms of CPU cycles as well as
time used, as shown in Table II. Oat init and Oat exit are
orders of magnitudes larger than Otramp. This is because
they involve establishing or terminating the attestation session
and the communication between the Normal and the Secure
worlds. Since the initialization and exit happen only once for
each attestation, their overhead tends to blend in the (much
longer) operation execution time and is unnoticeable.
B. Tests on Real Embedded Programs
We selected 5 open-source embedded programs to evaluate
the end-to-end overhead of OAT. We could not test more
programs because of the non-trivial manual effort required
for porting each program to our development board. This
requirement is due to embedded programs’ device-specific
nature. It is not posed by our system. We picked these
programs because they represent a reasonable level of variety.
Some of them may seem toy-like, which is not intentional but
reflects the fact that most embedded programs are simple by
design. We note that these programs are by no means standard
benchmarks. In fact, there are no standard benchmarks for
bare-metal embedded devices available at the time of writing.
It is also rare for embedded device vendors to publicly release
their firmware in source code form. The 5 selected embedded
programs are:
• Syringe Pump (SP) is a remotely controlled liquid-
injection device, often used in healthcare and food
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Fig. 3: Compile-time overhead
processing settings. We apply OEI attestation to the
“injection-upon-command” operation.
• House Alarm System (HA) [25] is an IoT device that,
when user-specified conditions are met, takes a picture
and triggers an alarm. We apply OEI attestation to its
“check-then-alarm” operation.
• Remote Movement Controller (RM) [27] is an embedded
device that allows the physical movement of its host
to be controlled remotely, similar to the example given
in §III-A. We attest the “receive-execute-command”
operation.
• Rover Controller (RC) [28] controls the motor on a rover.
We attest the “receive-execute-command” operation.
• Light Controller (LC) [26] is a smart lighting controller.
We attest the “turn-on/off-upon-command” operation.
Compile-time Overhead: We instrumented OAT compiler to
measure its own performance in terms of binary size increase
and compilation delay. Figure 3 shows the results for each
program. The absolute increase in code size ranges from 1 to
3 KB, which is acceptable even for embedded devices, despite
the seemingly large percentage (13%). We find that the size
increase is not proportional to the original code size and is
dominated by the trampoline library, which has a fixed size.
The compilation delay caused by the attestation-related code
analysis and instrumentation may seem high, averaging 62%.
But in absolute terms, the delay is less than 1 second for
the tested programs. We believe this is acceptable given that
(i) the overhead is on par with similar code analysis and
instrumentation techniques; (ii) the compilation is offline and
happens only once for each program version.
Operation Execution Time & Instrumentation Statistics:
For each test program, we measured the execution times with
and without OEI attestation enabled for the selected operation.
The results are shown in the column named “Operation Exec.
Time” in Table III. The sub-column “Overhead” shows the
relative delay caused by OAT to operation executions, averag-
ing 2.7%. We observed that the delays are unnoticeable and
blend in the much longer end-to-end execution time of the
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TABLE III: Runtime overhead measured on 5 real embedded programs
Prog. Operation Exec. Time OAT Instrumentation Statistics Blob Verificationw/o OEI (s) w/ OEI (s) Overhead (%) B.Cond Def-Use Ret Icall/Ijmp Critical Var. Size (B) Time (s)
SP 10.19 10.38 1.9% 488 2 1946 1 20 69 5.6
HA 5.28 5.36 1.6% 147 91 33 2 6 44 0.61
RM 10.01 10.13 1.3% 901 100 100 100 7 913 1.74
RC 2.55 2.66 4.5% 14 33 1 1 8 10 0.13
LC 5.33 5.56 4.4% 931 2420 10 10 4 205 1.35
Avg. N/A N/A 2.7% 496 529 418 23 9 248 1.89
operations.
It is worth noting that the execution delay caused by our
attestation may vary significantly as the following two factors
change: the length/duration of the attested operation and the
frequency of critical variable def-use events. For shorter oper-
ations, the attestation overhead tends to be higher percentage-
wise. For instance, the operation in RC (the shortest among
the tested programs) takes 2.55 seconds to finish without
attestation and 2.66 seconds with attestation, resulting in the
highest relative overhead (4.5%) among all tested programs.
However, this does not mean the absolute delay, in this case,
is longer than others or unacceptable.
The more frequent the def-use events of critical variables
are, the higher the attestation delay becomes. For example,
the operations in HA and LC are similar in lengths. But the
attestation overhead on HA (1.3%) is lower than the overhead
on LC (4.4%) partly because HA has fewer def-use events of
critical variables.
In the “Instrumentation Statistics” column, we show, for
each operation execution, the numbers of the instrumented
events encountered during the attestation (including condi-
tional branches, def-use checks, returns, and indirect call-
s/jumps) as well as the number of critical variables selected.
These statistics provide some insights into the overhead re-
ported earlier. The instrumented events occur about thousands
of times during an operation, which translates roughly to an
average per-operation delay of 0.15 seconds.
Measurement Engine Memory Footprint and Runtime
Overhead: The measurement engine inside TEE consumes
memory mainly for three purposes: the BLAKE-2s HASH
calculation, the critical data define and use check, and the
forward control-flow trace recording, including taken or not-
taken bits and indirect jump/call destination. The BlAKE-
2 HASH function only requires less than 2KB for storing
the block buffer, 32 Bytes for the IV, 160 Bytes for the
sigma array, and some temporary buffers. The critical data
check requires a static HASH table of 4KB with 512 slots,
and a dynamic pool for critical variables (the size of this
pool is proportional to the number of critical variables; in
our evaluation, the pool size is less than 2KB). The forward
control-flow trace in our evaluation is no more than 2KB. The
whole memory footprint of the measurement engine is less
than 10KB for the real embedded applications used in our
evaluation.
The runtime overhead of the measurement engine comes
TABLE IV: Number of Instrumentation Sites: Value-based (R1) and
Address-based (R2)
SP HA RM RC LC Avg.
R1 56 37 57 20 41 -
R2 140 388 842 45 131 -
R1 / R2 40% 9.5% 6.8% 44.4% 31.2% 26%
from three sources (i.e., the three major tasks of the measure-
ment engine): calculating the hash upon function return events,
recording critical data define events, and verifying critical data
use event. In our evaluation, on average, processing one return
event and calculating the new hash takes 0.19µs; recording a
critical data define event takes 11.04µs; verifying a critical
data use event takes 2.03µs. Obviously, hash calculation is
relatively fast whereas critical data event processing requires
a longer time mainly because it involves hash table lookup or
memory allocation for a new entry.
Value-based Check vs. Addressed-based Check: To show
the performance difference between value-based checking
(CVI) and address-based checking (e.g., DFI), we measured
the number of instrumented instructions needed in both cases
for all of the test programs. As shown in Table IV, on average,
CVI’s instrumentation is 74% less than the instrumentation
required by address-based checking (i.e., a 74% reduction).
Specifically, CVI’s instrumentation is as little as 6.8% of what
DFI requires when the program is relatively large (e.g., RM).
The number only increases to 44.4% when we annotated most
of the variables as critical in RC.
Space-efficiency of Hybrid Attestation: Our control-flow
attestation uses the hybrid scheme consisting both forward
traces and backward hashes to achieve not only complete
verifiability but also space-efficiency. To quantify the space-
efficiency, we compared the sizes of the control-flow traces
produced by OAT (R1 in Table V) and the traces produced
by pure trace-based CFI (R2 in Table V). On average, OAT’s
traces take only 2.24% of space as needed by control-flow
traces (i.e., a 97% reduction). This result shows that our hybrid
scheme is much better suited for embedded devices than solely
trace-based CFI in terms of space efficiency.
On the other hand, compared with existing hash-based
attestation schemes, OAT’s attestation blobs are not of fixed-
length and grow as attested operations execute, which may
lead to overly large attestation blobs. However, in practice,
OAT attestation blobs are reasonably small in size. Based
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TABLE V: Control-flow Trace Size (Bytes): With Return Hash (R1)
and Without Return Hash (R2)
SP HA RM RC LC Avg.
R1 69 44 913 10 205 -
R2 42941 3772 13713 585 13725 -
R1 / R2 0.2% 1.1% 6.7% 1.7% 1.5% 2.24%
on our experiments, the average blob size is 0.25kb. The
individual blob size for each program is shown in the “Blob
Size” column in Table III. We attribute this optimal result to
two design choices: (i) the hybrid measurement scheme that
uses fixed length hashes for verifying returns (more frequent)
and traces for verifying indirect forward control transfers (less
frequent); (ii) the operation-scoped control-flow attestation,
which generates per-operation measurements and is enabled
only when an operation is being performed.
Verification Time: We also measured OAT verifier’s execution
time when it checks the attestation blob generated for each
program. The result is shown in the “Verification Time”
column in Table III, averaging 1.89 seconds per operation.
It shows that verification is not only deterministic but fast. On
average, the verification is one order of magnitude faster than
the original execution (Table III). This result echoes that the
verification is not a re-run of the program. It is a static abstract
execution guided by the measurement stream.
C. Attack Detection via OEI Attestation
Due to the lack of publicly available exploits for bare-
metal devices, we injected vulnerabilities to the previously
discussed test programs, launch basic control-flow hijacks and
data corruption, and examine if the measurements generated
by OAT capture these attacks.
Specifically, we injected to the programs the vulnerabilities
similar to those shown in Listing 1. We then exploited the
vulnerabilities to (i) overwrite a function pointer; (ii) corrupt
a critical variable; (iii) trigger an unintended operation. By
verifying the measurements generated by OAT, we found that,
in each test case, (i) the illegal control-flow transfer caused by
the subverted function pointer is recorded in the measurement
stream; (ii) the CVI flag is set due to the failed CVI check; (iii)
the unintended operation is detected because the reconstructed
code path does not match the requested operation.
Although these tests are simple and created by ourselves,
they do demonstrate the basic functioning of our prototype and
confirm OEI attestation as a viable way for remote verifiers
to detect those attacks that are currently undetectable on
embedded devices. Moreover, they showcase that IoT backend
can now use OAT to remotely attest the operations performed
by IoT devices and establish verifiable trust on these devices.
D. Security Analysis
Our threat model (§III-D) anticipates that attackers may find
and exploit unknown vulnerabilities in the embedded programs
running in the Normal World. However, we assume code in-
jection or modification cannot happen, which the existing code
integrity schemes for embedded devices already prevent [16],
[37].
To evade OAT, a normal-world attacker would need to
1© disable the instrumentation or the trampolines, 2© abuse
the interfaces that the measurement engine exposed to the
trampolines, or CA-TA interfaces, 3© manipulate the control
flow in a way to generate a HASH collision, thus bypassing
the verification, or 4© modify the attestation blob including
replay an old recorded blob.
1© is ruled out by the code integrity assumption. Plus,
attempts to divert the control-flows of instrumented code or
trampolines are always recorded in the control-flow trace
and detected later by the verifier. Our design prevents 2© as
follows. OAT compiler disallows world-switching instructions
(smc) used outside of the trampoline library. This restriction
ensures that only the trampoline functions can directly invoke
the CA-TA interfaces and the rest of the code in the Normal
World cannot. To further prevent code-reuse attacks (e.g.,
jumping to the interface invocation point in the library from
outside), OAT loads the library in a designated memory region.
The compiler masks the target of every indirect control transfer
in the embedded program so that the trampoline library cannot
be reached via indirect calls or jumps or returns (i.e., only
hard-coded direct calls from each instrumentation site can
reach trampolines). This masking-based technique is highly
efficient and is commonly used for software fault isolation.
As a result, 2© is prevented.
As for 3©, we assume that the attacker may exploit program
vulnerabilities and manipulate the control flow of the program
in arbitrary ways. We prove that (see Appendix B) our control-
flow verification mechanism cannot be bypassed by such
a powerful attacker. Our proof shows that bypassing our
verification is at least as hard as finding a hash collision,
which is practically infeasible considering that BLAKE-2s is
as collision-resistent as SHA3 [7].
Our verification scheme prevents 4© because the integrity
of the attestation blob is guarded by a signature generated
from TEE with a hardware-provisioned private key. A verifier
can easily check the signature and verifies the integrity of the
attestation blob. Replay attack is also prevented by checking
whether the cryptographic nonce inside the attestation blob
matches what originally was generated by the verifier.
There is no higher privileged code (e.g., a standalone OS)
that needs to be protected or trusted because OAT targets bare-
metal embedded devices. For the same reason, it is realistic to
require the firmware to be entirely built using OAT compiler.
IX. RELATED WORK
Remote Attestation: Early works on remote attestation, such
as [60][44], were focused on static code integrity, checking if
code running on remote devices has been modified. A series
of works [4], [50], [21], [38] studied the Root of Trust for
remote attestation, relying on either software-based TCB or
hardware-based TPM or PUF. Armknecht et al. [5] built a
security framework for software attestation.
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Other works went beyond static property attestation. Hal-
dar et al. [61] proposed the verification of some high-level
semantic properties for Java programs via an instrumented
Java virtual machine. ReDAS [36] verified the dynamic system
properties. Compared with our work, these previous systems
were not designed to verify control-flow or dynamic data
integrity. Further, their designs do not consider bare-metal em-
bedded devices or IoT devices. Some recent remote attestation
systems addressed other challenges. A tool called DARPA [35]
is resilient to physical attacks. SEDA [6] proposed a swarm
attestation scheme scalable to a large group of devices. In
contrast, we propose a new remote attestation scheme to solve
a different and open problem: IoT backend’s inability to verify
if IoT devices faithfully perform operations without being
manipulated by advanced attacks (i.e., control-flow hijacks
or data-only attacks). Our attestation centers around OEI, a
new security property we formulated for bare-metal embedded
devices. OEI is operation-oriented and entails both control-
flow and critical data integrity.
A recent work called C-FLAT [2] is closely related to our
work. It enabled control-flow attestation for embedded devices.
However, it suffers from unverifiable hashes, especially when
attested programs have nested loops and branches. This is
because verifying a control-flow hash produced by C-FLAT
requires the knowledge of all legitimate control-flow hashes,
which are impossible to completely pre-compute due to the
unbounded number of code paths in regular programs (i.e.,
the path explosion problem). In comparison, OAT uses a
new hybrid scheme for attesting control-flows, which allows
deterministic and fast verification. Moreover, OAT verifies
Critical Variable Integrity and can detect data-only attacks,
which C-FLAT and other previous works cannot.
Online CFI Enforcement: Although control-flow attestation
has not been well investigated, CFI enforcement is a topic
that has attracted a rich body of works since its debut [1]. A
common goal shared by many CFI enforcement methods such
as [58], [49], [63], [48], [17], [18] is to find a practical trade-off
between runtime overhead and the level of precision. Previous
works such as [65], [64] also introduced CFI enforcement
to COTS or legacy binaries. CPI [41] prevents control flow
hijacking by protecting code pointers in safe regions. These
work made CFI increasingly practical for adoption in the
real world and serves as an effective software exploitation
prevention mechanism.
However, enforcing fine-grained CFI and backward-edge
integrity can be still too heavy or impractical for embedded
devices, mostly because of the limited CPU and storage
on such devices. Apart from less demanding on hardware
resources, OEI attestation has another advantage over online
CFI enforcement: it allows remote verifiers to reconstruct the
exact code paths executed during an operation, which enables
full CFI checking (as opposed to a reduced or coarse-grained
version) as well as other postmortem security analysis.
Moreover, CFI enforcement is not enough when it comes to
data-only attacks, such as control-flow bending, data-oriented
programming, etc. [14], [10], [33], [32]. But these attacks do
violate OEI and can be detected by OAT.
Runtime Data Protection: A series of work addressed the
problem of program data corruption via dynamic bounds
checking [20], [46], [19] and temporal safety [47]. DFI [13]
and WIT [3] took a different approach. They use static analysis
to derive a policy table specifying which memory addresses
each instruction can write to. They instrument all memory-
access instructions to ensure the policy is not violated during
runtime. Although effective at preventing data corruption,
these techniques tend to incur high runtime overhead due to
the need to intercept and check a large number of memory
accesses. We refer to this line of work as address-based
checking. In contrast, we define Critical Variable Integrity and
use the new Value-based Define-Use Check to verify CVI. Our
check is selective (i.e., it only applies to critical variables) and
lightweight. It is value-based and does not require complex
policies or extensive instrumentation. The CVI verification and
the control-flow attestation mutually compensate each other,
forming the basis for OEI verification.
DataShield[11] applies selective protection to sensitive data.
Their definition of sensitive data is type-based and also needs
programmer annotation. It relies on a protected memory
region to isolate the sensitive data and performs address-
based checking. In comparison, our critical variable annotation
is more flexible and partly automated. Instead of creating
designated safe memory regions, which can be unaffordable
or unsupported on embedded devices, we perform lightweight
value-based checks. Unlike DataShield, OEI does not concern
data confidentiality.
X. CONCLUSION
We tackle the open problem that IoT backends are unable to
remotely detect advanced attacks targeting IoT devices. These
attacks compromise control-flow or critical data of a device,
and in turn, manipulate IoT backends. We propose OEI,
a new security property for remotely attesting the integrity
of operations performed by embedded devices. OEI entails
operation-scoped CFI and Critical Variable Integrity.
We present an end-to-end system called OAT that realizes
OEI attestation on ARM-based bare-metal embedded devices.
OAT solves two research challenges associated with attesting
dynamic control and data properties: incomplete verification of
CFI and heavy data integrity checking. First, OAT combines
forward-edge traces and backward-edge hashes as control-flow
measurements. It allows fast and complete control-flow ver-
ification and reconstruction while keeping the measurements
compact. Second, OAT enforces selective value-based variable
integrity checking. The mechanism is lightweight thanks to the
significantly reduced instrumentation. It enables the detection
of data-only attacks for the first time on embedded devices. It
allows IoT backends to establish trust on incoming data and
requests from IoT devices.
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APPENDIX A
IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS OF OAT SYSTEM
Compiler-based Instrumentation: OAT compiler is built on
LLVM [43]. Besides the typical compilation tasks, it performs
(i) the analysis for identifying critical variables; (ii) the code
instrumentation for collecting runtime measurements on con-
trol flow and critical variables. The analysis works on the
LLVM IR. It first constructs the initial set of critical variables
by traversing the IR and searching for control-dependent
variables and programmer-annotated semantically critical vari-
ables. It then uses a field-sensitive context-insensitive Ander-
son pointer analysis to generate the global points-to informa-
tion. The compiler uses this point-to information to recursively
identify direct and indirect pointers to the critical variables
(i.e., critical pointers). It also performs a backward slicing
for each critical variable on the program dependence graph to
find its dependencies. All critical pointers and dependencies
are iteratively added to the critical variable set.
OAT compiler instruments the code via an added backend
pass in LLVM. The instrumentation is needed at both the
assembly level (for control-related instructions) and the IR
level (for data-related instructions). This is important because
the translation from the IR to the machine code can generate
additional control-flow instructions that need to be instru-
mented. The compiler inserts calls to trampolines at instruc-
tions that can change the control flow of attested operations
or store/load critical variables (Table VI). Though seemingly
straightforward, this instrumentation, if not designed carefully,
can break the original program because a trampoline call may
corrupt the destination register used by the original control
transfer. To avoid such issues, the instrumentation saves to
the stack the registers that are to be used for passing the
parameters to the trampoline. Moreover, the trampoline is
responsible for handling the caller-saved registers (normally
handled by callers rather than callees). This design reduces the
number of inserted instructions at each instrumentation site. It
also minimizes the stack frame growth. As a result, registers
changed during a trampoline call are restored immediately
after the call returns.
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Measurement Engine: We built the measurement engine as
a Trusted Application (TA) running in the Secure World. It
handles events generated by the trampolines (i.e., the Client
Application, or CA) during runtime. Control-flow events
are only generated and handled during an active attesta-
tion window (when an attestation-enabled operation is ex-
ecuting). Internally, the measurement engine maintains, for
each active operation, a binary trace (Sbin) for branches,
an address trace (Saddr) for indirect calls/jumps, and a
hash (H) for returns. At the end of an attestation session,
the engine concatenates Sbin and Saddr to form a single
measurement stream, S, in a sequentially parsable format:
Size(Saddr)|Saddr|Size(Sbin)|Sbin.
Data load/store events are only triggered by critical vari-
ables. To perform CVI check, the engine maintains a hashmap
to keep track of each critical variable’s last-defined value.
At every use-site of a critical variable, the engine checks if
the observed value equals the stored value in the hashmap.
If a mismatch is encountered, the engine sets a global flag,
F , to indicate the CVI violation. If a violation is detected,
the engine also records the variable address and the previous
return address as the context information C, which allows the
remote verifier to investigate the violation. Finally, the engine
generates a signed attestation blob that consists of S, H , F ,
and C if CVI verification failed, along with a nonce N sent
from the verifier who initiated the attestation. It will be passed
back to the normal world who will finally send the signed
attestation blob to our verification engine via the network.
Although we use the normal world’s network stack, we do
not need to trust it. Any corruption of the blob is detectable
by verifying the signature. Any denial of service by the normal
world network stack also causes attestation failure.
CA-TA Interaction: We implemented three CA-TA com-
munication interfaces compliant with the GlobalPlatform’s
TEE specification [29], a de-facto standard for TEE in-
terface design. The interfaces are oei_attest_begin,
commit_event, and oei_attest_end, used by the CA
to notify the TA of the respective event. To prevent potential
abuse (e.g., calling them via ROP), the measurement engine
ensures that the interfaces can only be called by the trampo-
lines and can never be invoked via indirect calls, jumps, or
returns (details in §VIII-D ).
Verification Engine: We prototyped a simple verification
engine based on the Capstone disassembler [9]. It takes as
input an attestation blob, the binary code that performed the
operation under attestation, and a CFG extracted at compile
time for that operation code. As described in §IV, the
verification process is fairly straightforward, thanks to our
hybrid measurement scheme.
For control-flow attestation, the verifier performs a static
abstract execution of the disassembled binary code. This
abstract execution is guided by the forward-edge traces in
the attestation blob. It simply traverses through the code and
performs CFI checks at each indirect control-flow transfer.
It also simulates a call stack for keeping track of return
addresses and updating the return hash, which is checked
against the reported hash in the end. This abstract-execution-
based verification is fast because it does not actually run the
code or have to exhaustively explore all possible code paths.
Moreover, unlike traditional attestation, which only gives a
binary result, our verification allows for the reconstruction
of the execution traces, which are valuable to postmortem
analysis. For CVI verification, the verifier checks if the CVI
violation bit is set in the attestation blog. If positive, it fails
the attestation and outputs the context information.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF CONTROL-FLOW VERIFICATION
Let h : {0, 1}? → {0, 1} be a collision resistant hash
function. Using h we can construct another hash function
H[op] which takes the sequence of values 〈z1, · · · , zm〉 as
follows: H1 = h(z1) and Hi+1 = op(Hi, zi+1) (1 ≤ i < m).
The value of H on the sequence is Hm. We rely on the
following property, which restricts the binary operation op we
can use.
If h is collision resistant, then H[op] is collision
resistant
Our implementation uses BLAKE-2s as h and supports a
variety of binary operations, such as concatenation and xor.
Recall that if op is concatenation, H[op] is very similar to the
classic Merkle-Damgrad construction. For the rest of the note,
we will fix the binary operation op (i.e., we use concatenation
as op in our implementation) and just write H instead of
H[op].
Let P be the program under consideration. Let C(P ) =
{c1, · · · , ck} and R(P ) = {r1, · · · , rk} be the call and return
sites in a program P (we will assume that the return site ri
corresponds to the call site ci). Recall that a proof σ has three
components (α, v, β), where α ∈ C(P )∗ (a sequence of call
sites), v is the hash value of the sequence of returns, and β
is a sequence of jumps (direct and indirect) and conditional
branches (essentially β has everything related to control-flow
transfers, except calls and returns). A path pi through the
control-flow graph (CFG) program P is called legal if it
satisfies two conditions: (A) the call and returns in pi are
balanced 4, (B) the jumps and conditional branches are legal
(this can be easily checked by looking at the source code
of P and the data values corresponding to the targets of
the indirect jumps). Π(P ) denotes the set of execution paths
through the CFG of the program P . The proof corresponding
to an execution path pi ∈ Π(P ) is denoted by σ(pi). Next, we
describe our verification algorithm.
Verification. Our verifier vrfy(P, σ) (let σ = (α, v, β)) and is
conjunction of two verifiers vrfyj and vrfyc described below.
• Verifier vrfyj(P, σ) checks that the jumps and branches
in β are valid (i.e. this can be easily done because
the verifier has the program P and the data values
4This means that call and returns satisfy the grammar with the following
rules: S → ci S ri (for 1 ≤ i ≤ k) and S → .
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corresponding to the targets of the indirect jumps). If
the jumps are valid, then vrfyj(P, σ) = 1; otherwise
vrfyj(P, σ) = 0
• Verifier vrfyc(P, σ) checks the validity of calls and re-
turns. This part is a bit more involved. Essentially vrfyc
“mimics” how the hash of the returns are computed and
then checks if the computed hash value matches the one
in the proof σ. Verifier vrfyc maintains an auxiliary stack
st and processes the sequence of calls α = 〈cj1 , · · · , cjn〉
as follows: The calls in α are processed in order, and the
verifier keeps running hash. Let us say we have processed
cj1 , · · · , cjr and are processing cjr+1 . Recall that from the
call site we can tell if there was a context switch in the
program execution (a context switch means that we are
executing in a different function). The call site has the
location of the program, so we can inspect whether we
are in the same function as the top of the stack (i.e., the
location of cjr+1 is different from the location of the call
site on top of the stack). If there was no context switch,
then we push cjr+1 on the stack. If there was a context
switch, then we pop the top of the stack (say cu), compute
v′ = op(v′, h(ru)), and push cjr+1 on the stack. If ru was
the first return computed, then v′ = h(ru). After all the
calls have been processed, let the hash value be v′. The
verifier vrfyc outputs a 1 if v = v′; otherwise it outputs
a 0.
The verifier vrfy(P, σ) is vrfyj(P, σ) ∧ vrfyc(P, σ).
Definition 1. A proof σ is called ambiguous iff there are two
paths pi and pi′ and pi such that: (I) σ = σ(pi) = σ(pi′) (II)
pi is legal and pi′ is illegal.
Note that if the verifier gets an ambiguous proof σ, then it
cannot reject it because it could also correspond to a legal path
pi. Therefore, an adversary is free to take an illegal path pi′
corresponding to the ambiguous proof. Therefore, adversary’s
goal is to generate an ambiguous proof.
Essentially the lemma given below informally states that if
an adversary can generate an ambiguous proof, then they can
find a collision in the hash function H[op]. Hence, if H[op]
is collision resistant, then it will be hard for an adversary to
find an ambiguous proof and “fool” the verifier.
Lemma 2. If there exists an ambiguous proof σ, then there
is a collision in the hash function H[op].
Proof: Let pi and pi′ be two execution paths that result in the
same proof σ. Moreover, let pi be legal and pi′ be illegal (recall
that σ is an ambiguous proof). Let rpi and rpi′ be the sequence
of returns for the two paths pi and pi′. The set of direct jumps
and call sequences for the two paths are the same (since they
correspond to the same proof σ), so the sequence of returns has
to be different (otherwise the two paths will be the same, which
is a contradiction). However, the two sequences of returns hash
to the same value under H[op] because the paths correspond
to the same proof. Thus, we have found a collision in H[op].

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